between russia and ukraine. the german marshall fund is the

host of this discussion. experts will focus on ukraine's security resilience, including military, cyber, and energy. my name is jonathan cass and i am director of democracy initiatives at the german marshall fund and also the cofounder for the transatlantic task force on ukraine. it is a collaborative transatlantic project that started in 2018 to strengthen

fans of democratic engagement and support ukraine, including democratic transformation and euro-atlantic integration. at tfu, rpr and others we cannot think of a more important moment for the transatlantic community to support ukrainians than right now. for the past eight years, ukrainians have been under continuous assault through multiple aggressions by the kremlin. russia's long war against the ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity has been nonstop. it includes illegal annexation, invasion, thousands of ukrainians killed, critical and under attack, relentless cyber -- infrastructure under attack, relentless cyber attacks, bomb

threats at ukrainians goals, and a fifth column of people working closely with the command to undermine ukraine and their future. unfortunately the list is too , long for us to even go into. but i know some of those that we with today will touch on those will be speaking with today will touch on those challenges that we have not even mentioned. dear as the use of a weapon. -- nord stream 2 as a weapon. today, there are over 100,000 russian troops and equipment on the border of ukraine, and this is on top of the challenges ukraine is experiencing. as we know, ukraine is a partner of the west, that you -- the eu and nato. ukraine's partners have been steadfast about standing with ukraine and its right to choose the future, not mr. putin's right to choose that future. an attack against ukraine will be met with a swift and severe

response. the last couple of weeks the united states, nato, and other partners have been working closely with the ukrainian government and people to try to crisis. address the current russian crisis. i want to highlight the role of the biden administration in rallying support for ukraine. also nato and secretary-general jens stoltenberg which just announced additional assistance to ukraine over the past couple of days, which i think is important in terms of to military security to strengthening the resilience of ukraine internally. a number of other countries have also stepped forward, and i thank for those that have been watching what is happening, you can really see a change in the approach of the alliance to this issue. and i think the threat level that is being discussed. there is a clear understanding now that mr. putin's designs are not only about security in your -- ukraine, but about security in europe and globally.

with this backdrop, i want to our founder and cochair, and afterwards we will send it to pf to mike kelly in geneva. and then we will have our ukrainian speakers weighing in. my colleague in brussels, who and also joining us ismy colleague in brussels, who has been a cofounder and partner with ttfu since the beginning in 2018. if i can right now, i am going to send it over to boris. thank you again for your leadership behind-the-scenes pulling this together. second, we will have a q&a session that will be moderated. so you can use the q&a function, and i think everybody after a couple years of these events knows exactly where that is located, and we appreciate

everyone's participation, and thank for joining us. boris, over to you. thank you very much, jonathan. welcome to all our speakers and all of you who are joining, and huge thanks to our partners, and of course, to the german marshall fund. let me share a few brief things regarding the u.s. response. there's no doubt a russian invasion is being taken very seriously by the united states and on your transatlantic partners, both on the diplomatic and deterrence front to impose what the white house calls massive consequences and severe economic consequences on russia. the level of reaction in coordination with our allies has been intense, perhaps unprecedented. and with ukraine as well you often hear the refrain nothing

about ukraine without ukraine. and it's no secret there are challenges in working with some of our allies, notably germany, on certain issues, not only nord stream 2, but i think is it's necessary to keep as united a front as possible, recognizing that it may not always be possible in every instance, but we need to keep in mind there are few things that wants more than a divided nato or au, and that would a disaster for ukraine, for european security, and indeed, again for local -- and indeed for global security. secondly, the u.s. government across various government agencies, state, defense, intelligence agencies, energy, usaid i think are working hard to help strengthen ukraine's spirit of resilience to counter russia's oppression. there have been stepped up efforts even within the last few weeks, and days, military and

other support, cybersecurity intelligence, countering , subversive efforts. a small example, state the state department has issued stat sheets recently countering russia's narrative. you can check them out on the state department's website, but this is an evolving process, and much more remains to be done to build up ukraine's resiliency including notably on the energy front. and i'm sure we will hear more about that from our speakers. now there are different views, and this is normal within the u.s. government and congress and policy community and analysts about to deter russia. how best to deter russia. for example, whether you hit them now with crushing sanctions and export controls and other measures more wait until after they invade. what kind of balance to strike between diplomacy and deterrence? but there is widespread agreement that putin is a danger that must be confronted and contained. and while there are some substantive differences between democrats and republicans on the

hill, there's no doubt there is a a very solid bipartisan congressional commitment to ukraine. you saw just last week the visit in kiev of seven key senators, democrats and republicans, and there's a bipartisan house delegation there now. also work on what would be really tough legislation with senator menendez, foreign relations committee chairman has called the mother of all sanctions bill. and so far this support for ukraine appears to extend to most of the media which has been covering this unbelievably to analysts and i think to the american public, although i would caution that there are voices who seem to be willing to concede to russia's sphere of influence, and a few what one might call pro-russian cheerleaders. for those of you old enough to remember the soviets used to call people like that useful

idiots. one final thought, even if we manage to avoid some form military invasion in the coming weeks, you can be sure of one thing. given not only potenza leaf that a democratically successful ukraine could serve as an example to the russian people posing a threat to his power, but also given putin's imperial ambitions and especially his frankly pathological obsession with ukraine, x-ray nationhood, separate identity. putin will continue to do whatever he can to destabilize and undermined ukraine. he and ultimate among the russian elite just cannot abide the idea of ukraine free to choose its own future. so barring some dramatic change in the kremlin, strengthening ukraine's security resilience will need to be a priority for long time and a priority not

only for ukrainians but for all those around the world who care about freedom and democracy and a rules-based international order. i look forward to and from our -- hearing from our distinguished speakers, and olena prokopenko over to you in kiev. thank you very much, orest. thank you, jonathan for your insightful remarks. dear colleagues, thank you for taking the time to join us today and welcome to the security situation and ways to enhance its resilience in the midst of multiple hazards. as you know, today ukraine is facing an unprecedented military threat from russia and the highs -- arguably the highest risk of a large-scale invasion that we can ever remember. along with russia's military buildup at ukraine's borders we are observing its escalated hybrid warfare that includes major cyber attacks on on state

databases and websites that carry citizens personal data. we are also witnessing a major wave of false flag terror attacks across ukraine targeting not only schools but also metro stations, trade centers and other public places. furthermore, russia's campaign in donbass continues and russia carries out full fledged energy war against ukraine. this is of course combined with the ongoing information war fought through multiple media outlets, online and the traditional ones. as you know multiple rounds of security talks with russia over the past few weeks ended in a rejection of its outrageous ultimatums. today advisors are meeting again but no breakthrough is expected . and although the negotiations to continue suggesting some cautious hope for diplomatic resolution the growing security , concerns called for a number

of urgent steps to be made and we believe first and foremost they call for strengthening ukraine's own integration -- euro-atlantic integration efforts. this means accelerating up -- implementation of long overdue reforms which are increasingly difficult to secure right now as the president's team is starting early preparations to the next elementary and presidential elections of 2023-2024. this is complicated by the fact ex-president poroshenko has almost reached president zelensky's level of popular support, 21% against 23.5 come -- and has a good chance of winning both residential and rodda races. despite these domestic power struggles, the supreme elite should not use external situation threats as an opportunity rollback critical reforms including judicial and

intellectual reforms. they should end political persecution of opponents and predecessors including x president poroshenko and join forces with all pro ukraine and democratic actors to fight russia's aggression. there's also critical need to further strengthen ukraine's transatlantic support, particularly we believe international community should adopt legislation in visiting strong personal sanctions against russia's leadership. the defense and banking sectors in russia and the nord stream ii pipeline and in case further aggression against ukraine, western partners should also significantly increase their defense and cybersecurity assistance to ukraine which some partners are already doing. furthermore it is critical nato expand its military presence in the baltic states and poland and offer ukraine clear prospects of nato membership conditions on tangible reform deliverables.

and today we have invited three distinguished ukrainian experts to discuss about how realistic it is for these steps to materialize and who can help us make sense of the current security development. and i'm delighted to introduce them to you. today we're joined by yehor cherniev, member of the ukrainian parliament, head of the permanent delegation of the nato parliamentary assembly. our next speaker is olena prokopenko, of the democratic initiative foundation. we also have with us president of the dixi group one of ukraine's leading energy policy think tanks. i would like to address my first question to yehor cherniev. yehor, as head of ukrainian

delegation, what is your current assessment of the current state of ukraine-nato relations? and what other technical and political conditionality is separating us from being offered the membership action plan in the foreseeable future? yehor, over to you. >> hello to everyone. thank you for this invitation and it is important actually to have this conversation. of course because of the buildup of russian troops near our borders. as you all know, one of the ultimatums of today was not too and large the native to the east has called for, native movement

ukrainian movement to nato is a , red line for russia. we have our own right to choose our path and actually this decision should be made only by the alliance and actually ukraine. however, we have to start i think from the beginning, from 2008, when it was made the decision about making decision about the next step should be the summit of the head of the ministers of foreign affairs -- from nato. and on this summit should be made decision about that.

but today is 2022. and actually we spent almost 40 20 years since 2008 without any decision, without any step toward from nato that was ukraine. unfortunately. yeah, we have programs which we go through each year, year by year, and have good estimation from both sides of nato. and actually de facto, this time of 30 years of nothing was one of the greatest signal to russia federation that they can do what they want. initially this is the problem.

the war in ukraine and actually the war in georgia was one of the answers of russian federation to the absence of action from nato. if we became a nato member ten years ago, i think that today right now will be another one, another action. so what is the problem? or to membership first of all? it's about reforms.

yes we have to achieve a lot of , conditions, a lot of indicators that should make us closer to nato center. however, as you know, the membership action plan was in before this in the conference, 1999. other countries was -- well, became a member without any membership action plan. and if you compare ukraine 2008 to 2022, this is two different countries. we did a lot through this 13 years and we actually do a lot -- did a lot of reforms. this what i am talking about with our partners, that we need quite concrete least of -- list of indicators what

should be done for the next step. and actually this list it's a , map. because maps consist of analytical programs. these smaller list of indicators are requirements that should be achieved. and i'm not talking about the membership of in a year or in two years or in three years even. because we understand we have to do a lot of homework. we have to achieve a lot, but still we have to have clear indicators. and these clear indicators is actually a membership action plan. i can use as an example, for

example north macedonia or montenegro, countries which had approximately eight to ten years between maps and membership. ok. we, as i said, understand we have to do a lot. so this is the first list of reasons why we still without map. the second, and i think it's more important. it's about political decision. it's not a secret that some countries have some concerns about our movement to nato. and our further membership in nato. as you may be heard during the last week some statements of

officials from germany, yeah, that ukraine will never be a member of nato, or crimea will never return to ukraine. i think we should do a lot not only from the ukrainian side but also from the side of many other partners from the alliance to convince germany and german government to move forward. because there is not war between russia and ukraine. this is a war between authoritarian regime and democracy.

and next countries will be countries from european union or from nato because as we know, it's not about rational reasons for putin. it's more about the global idea. as he said a few years ago that it should be some common space, vladivostok to lisbon. this is the idea. he tried to reestablish ussr in their former border. he is trying to spread kremlin influence on the warsaw pact countries. so right now we need to be stronger as an eastern plank of

nato and old democracy. and our partnership should understand that we fight for all democratic worlds, not only for ukraine. i think i can stop. if you have any questions, i would like to answer them. >> thank you very much, yehor for this outlook. i would like to get your opinion on what other security support measures could be taken right now in addition to the prospects of the nato membership action plan and eventual membership which will not happen in the near future, unfortunately. what can the west due to ukraine to support its security resilience? what can nato do what the

, consolidated west due for ukraine? >> well, i have to underline that we as a partner of nato since 90's actually have taken part in different common operations. not only of training of ukraine but also its operations in kosovo, afghanistan, in mediterranean sea, et cetera, et cetera. and we actually showed ourselves as a reliable partner. for now, what can be done from the alliance part? first of all, it's training. i think it should be the strong position on the diplomatic level, and we have it.

so any ultimatum can be offered from any third party alliance about ukraine. so the decision about our movement to nato is decision only for select countries and ukraine. the second position, so no setback in this position and actually we have this strong position and not only the alliance but all allies from alliance. the second one is training. of course, it's training. and our collaboration. i remind you that last year we

received european status and had opportunity partner that help us to have some information from intelligence services of these countries. and this help us to increase our interoperability with countries of northern treaty. more training, more support. it would be great because nato as alliance cannot impose sanctions. but also they can do, they work with all members of participating countries to work

with their government about sanctions. actually, i can add about sanctions another one. approximately one and a half months ago i was in, i was delegation in russia. we had a lot of different meetings with congress and senate. and from some of senators we agreed that we will offer a list of sanctions from our perspective, from ukrainian side, what can be imposed and what can be more effective to face this threat from russian federation. and actually menendez and rubio received our offers, this list of sanctions which was prepared

by the council of defense and security and our prime minister in the hope that we would see new sanctions from our list of sanctions in congress, and in senate. because within not only to senate but also to some congressmen. and also we sent this list of sanctions to our british colleagues, to the u.k. parliament. these sanctions and diplomatic and trainings plus of course weapons, these four positions can make stronger ukraine at our -- and our position in this situation. there are stronger ukrainian

-- the stronger the ukrainian army, the less options of russian federation. >> thank you, yehor. i just want to ask you one more question within one minute perhaps because we're pressed on time. but do you think the u.s. military assistance to ukraine is sufficient for the moment? we saw just last week another shipment of defense weapons to ukraine from the u.s., and we can see intelligence support to ukraine increasing. is anything being held back that is needed at the moment in your opinion? and what else can be done for ukraine in specific terms by the u.s.? >> yeah. well, we appreciate support from the u.s., the u.k., from canada, from different countries that

supported and supplied to us weapons. this is not a secret that it starts from air ground bombing to the military, from south. so that's why we need more as possible assistance, and aircraft, antimissile, anti-ship systems. because one of the scenarios is that they envision can be from the agency, -- aegean sea, from the crimea. so that's why the short lease of -- list of most important weapon that we need. >> thank you very much again, yehor and i would like to continue with our next speaker, maria zolkina. maria, in the past few weeks we have heard of multiple scenarios of the russian defense of that may play out from the escalated hybrid threat to the full-fledged invasion of

ukraine. and now i would like to focus not on this scenario so much as on ukraine's capability to respond. how ready are we to face escalation of the russian aggression, and whose support can we realistic talk politically and militarily? maria, the floor is yours. >> thank you. a couple of words about the general context what is important in ongoing negotiations. first of all, what we have to actually emphasize together with our western partners especially with u.s. was frontline negotiations with russia with let's say symbolic collective was. there should not be any serious decisions and negotiations until russia demonstrate tangible de-escalation alongside ukraine and russia border and in the framework of other types of possible russian attacks against ukraine. so during december for instance, what we would've heard from our american colleagues is that

until russia de-escalate it would be no progress in negotiations. but nevertheless, russia not only de-escalate the situation but even made it harder and decrease the level of tensions. those negotiations are actually hidden by this act and their going on. so this is like the principal we should all from expert position emphasize regarding the decision-makers, both in ukraine and in western countries. the second important point is that the real motivation, the real motive and the real argument and goals actually russia is following and trying to implement a region. they are not about those unrealistic demands russia makes or underlines information. so from ukrainian perspective we had some fears about that russia does not expect that nato will

give any guarantees of -- let's say but some of the nato members. in response to russia concerns can agree at some point do let's say to decrease their intensity between nato and ukraine. and what yehor has already said that ukraine -- despite of the lack of membership perspective, have increased seriously the level of our relations. one of our fears is that there should not be in the, should not be any compromises about how actively russia or how actively ukraine and nato regardless of russia fears, even if we don't have a membership perspective for ukraine as of now. and now let's go together let's switch to the idea how and what actual supported mechanisms can be used and should be used, and where the synergy of ukraine

capabilities and putin decide -- [inaudible] in terms of preventing russia from invasion or other forms of aggression. so first of all we have to divide all the support mechanism ask it into two parts. first of all is what is being done right now in order to prevent russia from any kind of serious aggression, and on the other hand, what should be done immediately if there are some signals and some actions in the frame of aggression? so about preventive measures, so of course the most important mechanism to support ukraine is to supply arms to ukraine, weapons and new technologies which we lack actually.

from this point we have -- we are pretty satisfied with our relations with the united states, who are doing it very quickly and supporting ukraine with new technologies and weapons right now. but at the same time this is not only about receiving some weapons and about arms supplies from the u.s. and great britain. this is also about issues we have some european countries like with the germany. we know that during come for instance, last week the problem actually raised up to official level when the ukrainian parliament appealed their colleagues in germany in order not to prevent not only, in order to prevent germany from further, any kind of block for weapon supply to ukraine by other nato members.

we know that there was a problem when germany doesn't support ukraine itself, but moreover, they prevent other nato members to the specific mechanism of consent is to support ukraine and with arms supply. so this is what is going on right now, and we have as of now ukrainian army doesn't need soldiers from any other country. of course we would appreciate it but we understand it will not happen but we don't need soldiers. we don't need people from other countries' armies. we need just technologies and weapons in order to raise the price for any kind of intervention for russia. and this is how ukraine contribute to the overall european collective security by its own people resources, by their skills and by their

readiness to fight. in case we need to do that and capability, we will have to do it at very high right now. it depends in terms of in what form, what scale it would be, this aggression. but at the same time the collaboration with the west is that we provide you with our army and you provide us with the weapons. this is the current scheme. we had to go forward with. the second point here, how to support ukraine and what we actually ask for and where we are ready to collaborate is about identity development of the strongest possible sanctions. and again we are pretty close to the maximum possible sanction when it comes to the u.s. and again there is no, we don't see such a high readiness for similar, strong as possible package when it comes a european

union countries, not for the european in general but some european countries. we have to emphasize that. regardless of the form or model of aggression, rather russia can choose. the sanctions should that actually, the signal to russia should be like that. regardless of what form of aggression you start, the sanctions will be launched. and this is a good preventive mechanism if russia understands that the collective, let's say collective west will not measure is this aggression enough to launch the strongest possible sanctions, or is this still not enough? we don't speak about scenarios. but majority of experts, including me, they say that the most comfortable let's say for russia is not in the

full-fledged invasion but serious escalation and donbass or in other parts. some provocations in the sea, some other territories of ukraine, cyber attacks, attacks of some critical infrastructure in ukraine. and let's imagine if russia uses the scenarios it is pretty enough to launch the most, the strongest sanctions which should be actually not only developed by the should be explained to russia. so this game when there is no consensus between u.s. and the most powerful europe-based countries, what we consider enough to launch strong sanction. this is a pretty weak place and our common diplomacy towards

russia. yes, so to conclusions. so this is about sanctions. sanctions should include also further strong signal regarding personal sanctions, which are not, you know, which is specific issue, but it's a strong signal towards russia. and all this package let's say with sanctions they should be immediately launched as soon as we have some problem. and a couple of figures, a couple of numbers instead of actually conclusions about how ukraine society is ready or not ready to, you know, to counter fight. the latest public opinion poll at the end of december 2021 conducted by democratic initiative foundation and center both based in ukraine, so

ukrainian society in ukraine society it's about 43% of people who are ready to personally join some kind of fighting activities. so 10% are ready -- 10% 10% are ready to join ukrainian army. 10% ready to join either ukrainian army or some kind of voluntary battle like like a was in 2014. and 23% are ready to support those fighting with any other kind of means and support, but not fighting themselves, you know? and as a result, and about revocation since olympics with -- so implications and so on if

40% in ukraine society. again, back to december 2021, who thinks that common military exercise between ukraine and these western partners will rather prevent russia from invasion than provoke. and since 2014 this is like stable topic opinion about -- for reaching sustainable peace exactly and occupied donbass. these are pretty simple and they are right now the same as they were all the previous years. first of all, democratic -- diplomatic pressure on russia with making sanctions stronger, the second one is strengthening economic and military potential and this is the point to a unite our efforts to follow this actually. >> thank you so much, maria, and follow up question regarding our partners and assistance to ukraine. what do you think could be ukraine's most effective

strategy towards germany to provide significant assistance to ukraine? there are reports a few minutes ago about some defense systems being provided but we need much more from partner as large and influential as germany. so what can be ukraine's strategy to address that? >> i think that to respond to this issue ukraine first of all have to make the problem official. so diplomacy not always like some loud announcement, you know? loud statement. but at some point like we have right now critical, the crisis we're in right now, so it might be useful to make the problem official and public. the second idea or the second instrument is to work together with our allies. that is why i recalled the problem with germany right now speaking to actually mainly

american audience, because as far as of this lack of -- is a problem not only for ukraine but also for our western partners like great britain, u.s. and canada, a lack of consensus with some other european countries like germany august issue. -- on this issue. so we need to collaborate, and if it will be like a diplomatic work and attempt to persuade our partners, at least not to make obstacles for ukraine, the synergy effect of this, diplomacy will be great. thank you again, maria. and one last quick question to you. how did the changes in the leadership of ukrainian defense sector, primarily and specifically the appointment of -- as defense minister play out in the current security crisis? >> i'm sorry, my voice is not ok

for public speaking, but i still try. the appointment to the defense, i think this is the way out of a crisis, institutional crisis in which unfortunately the ministry of defense of ukraine appeared to be during last year. so regardless of the fact that this political person has never been involved in any defense bodies, he's a good manager and he proves to be a good manager in his previous minister, which, where he worked for the ministry for integration. and due to attempts to make the ministry of defense not the ministry of the army but make it a civic structure which should be ruled and we should have civil chief, i think this is the good way. as of now in terms of

institutional council over all the defense really gets better, even though not so much time has passed since the appointment. >> thank you so much again, maria. this sounds very promising. i'm turning it over to our next speaker. you are focusing on ukraine's energy. please elaborate on what we are in terms of addressing the energy crisis that has exacerbated the escalated tensions with russia. also is ukraine moving towards a green economy fast enough to consider renewables as a viable alternative to traditional sources in the next few years? over to you. >> thank you very much. good morning and good evening. thank you for the possibility to

talk today on energy security. so let me start from the statement that russia is already using energy against ukraine. it started around last year. it started in 2006. then there was a crisis in 2009. mr. putin always said that this is just a business, that gas prices for ukraine as just an economic relations with ukraine. but then we saw formulas, gas price in exchange of -- then there was a formula gas prices and exchange of not signing association agreement. so very clear picture of russia is using gas against ukraine. last year in 2021 you saw how russia can use gas as a weapon not only against ukraine but

also against the eu by controlling the volumes of supply, gas to the eu countries. so i would say that now rush is using gas as a weapon not only against ukraine but also against the eu. and, unfortunately, this situation i think will last in the future. so we have to prepare to such conditions and we have to develop our resilience together. now to answer your question, how russia -- in its war with ukraine. we have analyzed some let's say threats which already happened with, in ukraine with support, sorry, the support of russia i would like to ask john to share one slide with your colleagues.

so let me divide the threat to six categories. it will be easy. physical threats, physical damage to infrastructure, or disasters, just as an example. ukraine lost gas and electricity infrastructure in crimea. also when russian troops fired energy facilities on demonstration lines, for example, electricity facilities, they did not allow us to prepare -- repair for quite a long period of time. cyber threats, we all remember a few years ago there was a huge hacking attack on ukraine. biological attacks which happen actually on occupied territories of russians, they allowed or they do it purpose which might create really serious environmental damage to the

people who live there. and also there might be something happen with nuclear, but not yet, thank god. informational threats happening all the time. we will live with this. information contained ukrainian gas infrastructure is outdated, it can be used gas supply for europe. it's inefficient and so on and so forth, but here i would propose to look at russian infrastructure and how much methane leakage russia creates. let's not talk about this today. climate threats and economic threats. economic threats, just as an example we can talk about nord stream ii. we can talk about locate coal supply from kos extend through

-- from kazakhstan through russia to ukraine which happened just last year, if you remember. the next slide, please. so we think that four out of these threats russia may use in its war in 2022. first of all, the damage to infrastructure, there might be explosion of some gas infrastructure, and then blackmailing the eu countries to demand use of nord stream nord stream ii, for example. there might be also physical damage to electricity infrastructure because ukraine is going to join electricity, common electricity system in the european union. so in order to prevent doing this, this might happen. or as in the war, russia may destroy the electricity

infrastructure and not allow people to actually use electricity, or many people use electricity to pump water from the ground. so there will be shortage of water supply. cyber attacks, the same on gas infrastructure and electricity might happen. informational, as i said this is what we live with and fight with every year. we have to travel to the eu countries and explain that russia uses disinformation campaigns against ukraine and explains with facts and figures why it is not true. it will definitely continue. an economic threats, again, this can be locate of gas supply or coal supply to ukraine. also there might be a possibility from russia and

belarus to blockade world products, supply to ukraine. that's what might happen or what might worsen if russia would like to use energy as an instrument in its potential further escalation of the war. then the question regarding the economy. i would like to say that our government has made a lot of commitments towards urbanization and green the agenda. ukraine declared that it will join green new strategy. ukraine joined hydro -- sorry, hydrogen association based in the eu, and many other associations, but what is needed is to fix this declaration

somewhere in official documents. so we have to adopt national energy and climate plan. we have to officially say when ukraine will phase out. these deadlines are still not fixed officially. this i think would be really, really very good for companies, for civil society, for just ordinary citizens to understand that these planned decorations are real. what we need actually for this to happen -- first of all, it's a really huge investment. we have to invest approximately 10 billion euros every year to our energy sector if you want to be fully decarbonized by 2070. this is huge money. ukrainian companies, ukraine

citizens do not have them, so the government really needs to work fast or hard to find international companies and other sources would like to invest in renewables, decarbonization and energy efficiency. maybe i will stop here and will be happy to answer your questions. >> thank you so much, olena. [indiscernible] [inaudible] [no audio] >> you are frozen. you might want to adjust. >> can you repeat that again? >> hello? i'm sorry. olena, can you hear me?

>> yes, i can. >> just repeat your question. yes, yes. >> sure. i was asking what other types of international assistance in addition to decrease investments -- to increased investments that ukraine needs and what of the types of assistance from the energy sector could help us make ukraine energy resilience and energy independent? and another question if possible, those commitments that you said should be formalized in public documents, are the commitments on the government side to actually do that and all those documents drafted already? are the on the table yet? >> thank you. let me start from the first question, investments. first what ukraine needs to improve energy sector and to move towards decarbonization path. definitely actually develop and

deployment of technologies, and here i would like to say that small reactors might be the issue where ukraine and u.s. can enhance their cooperation. gas production, -- great experience and a lot of companies that can use, actually ukrainians do not easily -- increase gas production and i'm pretty sure that ukraine government would welcome this. energy efficiency and new technologies in energy efficiency. ukraine is not, is very, very energy inefficient. so to increase come to save energy i think technologies are needed here. in terms of political, let's say issues, we really need support

of international partners to integrate to the european electricity system which would happen in 2023. we understand will be a lot of obstacles which russia will create, but we need support of the eu and the u.s. to be ready to join in 2023. i also wanted to say that united states -- i'm sorry, just 30 seconds if possible. we are running out of time. it would be really good if the department of energy in u.s. government could help the ministry of energy and other stakeholders could help build this capacity in ukraine.

i believe this would really enhance cooperation. thank you very much. >> thank you very much, olena. thank you to all of our speakers. i would like to turn it over to my colleague, senior fellow at the gmf office in brussels, to share with us a european perspective on the current security developments and to take questions from our distinguished audience, which we have many already. >> thank you very much. bruno, over to you. >> thank you, olena.

i'll be very short because i understand we have just over 15 minutes, if i'm not mistaken. so just quickly in brussels, i think most of us are well informed about what's happening here. let me just confirm the level of concern is extremely high in brussels. it's the issue of the day and everyone is talking about what's happening on the eastern side of the union. i think however brussels being brussels, the political configuration is very complex. there is really no agreement on what the holistic strategy should be of the european union to address this crisis. i think one thing countries do agree on, one strategy is accepted by all member states,

and that is to raise the cost for putin. that i think member states agree on. to raise the cost through economic sanctions and some also go further than that and agree to deliver technology and military means to ukraine. however, even though there is agreement on raising the cost, i think countries still don't agree on how high to raise the cost for potent. -- for putin. i think this is still a major issue in brussels. i actually just came back from the nato headquarters. two hours ago. i think the day was a bit different. -- different than at the eu. it's the same thing in brussels, sometimes we laugh. there's this virtual wall between them.

but actually i think the net result of putin's aggressive actions is that nato is even more united than before. i think we clearly see that now. the conversation i had at nato also reflects that. the alliance has been steady, i think, in communication, is being transparent also on what a tragedy if. i've also been very surprised to see how quickly the alliance reacted to increase the defense of its most eastern member states. denmark, spain, france, the united states, also belgium now is considering sending additional troops. helicopters to the member states of nato or the eastern flank. i think there's really concern here that no one in brussels or at least war is still seen as a

realistic option unfortunately by many here in town. but of course, in the meantime, diplomacy has to be invested in. there is a belief here that as long as diplomacy is going, at least, war can be avoided. of course, it's very nice that nato is reinforcing its member states, but what does it all mean for ukraine? ukraine will not become a member state tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. it's not because of technical issues. there is simply no political agreement in the alliance for that, and i think the ukrainian armed forces have progressed intensively over the past years. our rapidly modernizing and gaining nato standard processes. so from a technical perspective, there's no issue here, but it's just a political thing.

what nato will do in that respect is continuing its diplomatic messaging. reinforcing its support for ukraine. there will also be an increased effort to provide greater intelligence and more information. obviously ukraine should take advantage of every possible investment program that is available at nato, that's for sure. i also think it's an important task for nato and the eu to keep support for ukrainian democracy because democracy is the best threat that's important. i guess this rounds up how we see things in brussels. i don't pretend to speak for everyone in this town, but hopefully i have summarized a little bit what their views are. so, i've spent way too much so far. we have about 10 minutes to take some questions, so let me get into that immediately. and as your humble moderator, i want to be kind to the journalists that are listening

right now, so why don't they like a question from the national news agency in ukraine and go back to the panel? basically there are two questions here. one member of the audience is asking if ukraine duration is the main reason for russian aggression, is it because ukraine wants to become a member of nato? that's the situation we see a -- that we see appearing. the second question is about whether or not the ukrainian government has some sort of strategy in mind in crimea. so let me just take this question further and go back to the panel. please remember, we have about 10 minutes left, so be sure to be concise in your answers. get to the point. yehor, what's your view on this?

>> so, to the first question, it's not only about our movement in nato. it is an essential question, because as i said before, russia considers ukraine as a part of their territory, and try to spread misinformation or disinformation not only in the ukraine or russia. that ukraine is a failed state. that ukraine didn't exist in the history as a sovereign country. so why exactly now the escalation? from my point of view, because of the figures that we have according to our survey.

80% of ukrainians want to be part of the european union. approximately 60% of ukrainians want to be part of nato. so russia understands that the windows of opportunity are closing, because 80 years ago, it was definitely absolutely different. in 2018, not more than 35% of ukrainians wanted to be -- wanted the ukraine to be a member of nato. so, this is the point. on the second question, does the government have a strategy, yes. but i can't discuss it right now with you online, because the strategy is for different

scenarios. at least four different directions we consider in the invasion. it is a potential invasion, so yes on all of these directions. we view the best from all sides, not only the army, but also territory defense units. according to our points of the new law about the nation. so for the russian federation, we will face not only with the army also with different resistance. >> thank you very much for that. in the interest of time, let me move to some more questions. there's also another interesting question here, and actually someone is asking what role does belarus play in the current situation?

perhaps maria, olena, could you respond to this? >> i can certainly respond. i think that we don't divide any more, at least from the ukrainian perspective, we don't divide any more the danger which can come from russian territory and the danger which is coming from belarus. so this is like the new instrument of how can russia try to hide its intervention and some provocation, if it's time to do it from the territory, but -- if it tries to do it from the territory, but for our foreign audience, we need to explain that though ukraine has more than 1000 kilometers of the border with belarus, the majority of these borders, a great part of this order is not -- this border is not suitable for effective land operation,

but nevertheless, it's still a risk, especially taking into account that not only the east of ukraine, but the northern east is also like the miscue -- risky region in terms of any possible invasion or any provocation. so the rule of belarus here is just to be a platform which can easily be used by russia for the same goal. which russia simply may not be interested to use for the russian territory. not to make the aggression obvious for the west. >> thank you. let me add here. from an energy perspective, the energy sector belarus has a role to play to supply electricity. for technical purposes. there might be a scenario where

ukraine's ancillary integration plan will start its work in five days, when ukraine would like to connect. an isolated move. belarus might not agree to connect, actually. this might be the first problem and the second problem is the supply of oil products for ukraine. because ukraine and belarus supply up to 70% of oil products to ukraine now. -- russia and belarus. and if they stop the supply, there will be a possibility to replace this fuel, but the time will matter. so belarus can play some role to even destroying energy security

in the space. >> thank you for clarifying that. it is indeed important for everyone to understand what's happening. it is not always fully understood around here. so, let me just take one more question. we still have two minutes on our clock. so let's benefit from that. the question that i thought was interesting here is because it's not only about the traditional military aggression, but it's also about hybrid warfare, which is an equal part of the problem. one questioner is asking, if the panel can elaborate a bit more on the state of resilience and protection of critical infrastructure, which obviously would be a primary target of any cyberattack or form of cyber aggression. not only thinking about the energy central, but also thinking about hospitals, schools, food supply. how well is ukraine prepared to

defend its critical infrastructure? who wants to go first? yehor, yelena, maria. [laughter] well, i can be first. it was not better, as was quite a huge invasion and quite big damage of our not only critical infrastructure, but it is a disaster of authorities. so since that time, we had been quite good and resolved this system of cyber security. that is why the last cyber attack was not so effective or didn't achieve their i think main goals to destroy the database and steal this data

from the ukrainian authority. would you like to add something to this, maria, olena? >> i wanted to speak on what they said before. may be it is not the time to discuss these places, but i want to believe that our government with regional authorities have developed local resilience plans to safeguard and protect them with the companies who engage. i know that something is

preparing the regional session is prepared at the regional and local level. we can say about the good experience ukraine already has on a local and regional level, because in 2014, no one was ready for any attack on political infrastructure. there were permanent regular on a daily basis problems with electricity supply, with gas supply in terms of heating like everything. and unfortunately for donbar, and the rest of the ukraine, how to react to support their hospitals, to support schools and what to do with the houses for retired people -- what to do with such public social entities. so people and authorities from

donbas all know, and i hope they have started sharing their practical experience with the rest of the ukraine. >> thank you very much. i hate to end good debate, but i'm afraid we have to be prompt. forgive me, audience, for not taking all your questions, but i do congratulate the panel on all the things that were said. this was already a fantastic briefing on the current state of affairs. olena, thank you for your great moderation, as well. you steered us through this stormy waters with professionalism. so here's my contribution and back to you. >> thank you. i want to say, we're going to be punctual. thank you for your moderation as well. to all our colleagues at csu,

thank you everybody. to our panelists, we will come back to you again, obviously this is such a serious situation. what you laid out and explained today is so important for ukraine's partners, to better understand, and hearing from you directly was important for all of us. we hope to reconnect on these issues again with you and other colleagues, and again, thank you everybody for joining today on a very busy -- during a busy week and a challenging one. on that note, have a good rest of your day, whether you are in washington, brussels, or kiev. thank you. take care. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2022] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org]

the 2022 state of the state address from lansing. this is 25 minutes.